An authentication protocol is a procedure by which an informant tries to convey n bits of information, which we call an input message, to a recipient. An intruder, I, controls the network over which the informant and the recipient talk. I may change any message before it reaches its destination. If the protocol has security p, then the recipient must detect this cheating with probability at least 1 ? p.
Introduction
Authentication is one of the major issues in Cryptography. Authentication protocols can take on a variety of forms. The the informant and recipient may or may not rely on complexity assumptions (e.g. that factoring is hard). They may or may not wish to be able to prove to third parties that the message was indeed sent by the informant. For a general survey of authentication issues and results, the reader may refer to 9]. This paper deals with the simple scenario where two parties A and B communicate and want to assure that the message received by B is the one sent by A. We provide nearly tight bounds for the case of \two party unconditionally secure authentication without secrecy" de ned as follows. A protocol is \Without secrecy" if the informant and recipient make no attempt to hide the content of the input message from the intruder. In many cases the intruder may know the input message which the informant is trying to convey and wants only to convince the recipient that the informant is trying to communicate a di erent message.
If a protocol is \unconditionally secure," with security parameter p, then no intruder, regardless of computational strength, can cheat the communicating parties with probability more than p: An unconditionally secure protocol does not rely on complexity theoretic assumptions such as \There is no polynomial time algorithm to invert function f". Note that unconditionally secure protocols can be used in conjunction with computational hardness based protocols. If we desire unconditional security then clearly the two parties must share some secret bits. In this paper we try to characterize the number of shared random bits, as a function of p and n, where n is the length of the input message, that the two parties must share in order to assure that any change made to the message will be discovered with probability at least 1 ? p. We distinguish between single-round and multi-round protocols. Single-round protocols have been investigated extensively. For this case we provide tight bounds on the number of shared bits up to constant factors: it is (log n + log 1=p). More precisely, it is between log n + log 1=p and log n + 2 log 1=p.
In this paper we discuss the concept of multi-round authentication protocols, a subject which, to our knowledge, has not appeared in the literature. In a multi-round protocol, in order to authenticate an input message, the two parties send messages back and forth for several rounds and at the end if the (original) message has been altered it should be detected. We provide a multi-round protocol that requires 2 log 1=p + O(1) bits, i.e. it is independent of the message length. Hence we can conclude that interaction helps, i.e that the number shared secret bits required by a multi-round protocol is smaller than the number required by a single-round, when log 1=p < log n. We also investigate the number of rounds required to achieve these bounds. In general, O(log n) round su ce to achieve the 2 log 1=p bound, but no constant round protocol can achieve them, since we have a lower bound of log (k) n for a k-round protocol.
Previous Work
The one-round case has received a lot of attention in the literature. Gilbert, MacWilliams, and Sloane 5] , who were the rst to formally consider the problem, provided in 1974 a protocol requiring 2 maxfn; log 1=pg shared secret bits. Wegman and Carter 15] suggested using p-almost strongly universal 2 hash functions to achieve authentication. They described a protocol that requires O(log n log 1=p) secret bits. Stinson 10] improved upon this result, using p-almost strongly universal 2 hash functions to produce a protocol which requires approximately (2 log(n) + 3 ? 2 log log( 1 p ))(log( 1 p )) secret bits. His algorithm has a lower multiplicative constant and also saves on secret bits when 1 p is large relative to n.
A fair amount of work has also been devoted to the question of designing protocols where the probability of cheating is exactly inversely proportional to the number of authenticators (the information sent in addition to the message) (see 3], 6], 11], 12], 13], 14]). Adding this constraint makes the task much harder. The number of secret bits required is (n), and it is only possible to construct such protocols for values of p = 1 q : q a prime power.
As for lower bounds, still in the single-round case, Gilbert, MacWilliams, and Sloane 5] showed that the number of secret bits must be at least 2 log( 1 p ), a factor of 2 higher than the obvious bound implied by the intruder simply guessing the secret bits. Blum et al. 2] worked on the problem of checking the correctness of (untrusted) memories. They showed that a processor who wishes to store n bits of information in an untrusted (adverserial) memory must have a private, trusted memory of at least log(n) bits. This lower bound argument can be converted to the authentication scenario considered in this paper.
Organization of the paper
In the next section we de ne the model and the parameters involved. Section 3 describes the single-round protocols and Section 4 the multi-round protocols. Section 5 shows the lower bounds on the number of shared random bits, both for the single-rounds and for the multi-round protocols. Section 6 shows a lower bound on the redundancy, i.e on the the length of the authenticator (the parts of the transmissions that are not the input message). Section 7 contains upper bounds for authentication series, i.e. schemes that are designed to authenticate several messages. Section 8 is a discussion on the issue of the de nitions of security.
The Model
De nition 1 A k-round, secrecy l, probability p-authentication scheme for a message of n bits is a protocol in which informant A and recipient B alternate sending each other k messages (altogether) over an insecure line controlled by an intruder I. A and B share l bits of secret information and each of them has a separate private source of random bits. Their goal is for A to communicate an arbitrary n bit input message m to B. The intruder I, which has unbounded computational power, may intercept any of their communications and replace these communications with whatever I wishes. The intruder does not have to keep A and B synchronized and can feed A with a message before B has sent it. For all input messages m:
When there is no interference by the adversary in the transmissions (i.e. they are all delivered unaltered), B must output m and both A and B must accept with probability at least 1 ? p.
If, whenever there is no interference by the adversary in the transmissions (i.e. they are all delivered unaltered), B outputs m and both A and B accept with probability 1, we will call the protocol sound. We call other authentication protocols probabilistically sound. If p bit passwords which are appended to the secret string. This in particular prevents all impersonation attacks. We note that soundness is a stronger condition than probabilistic soundness. All the protocols which we present in this paper are sound. The lower bounds which we present in sections 5.1, the secrecy of single-and multi-round protocols and for the redundancy of protocols all apply only to sound protocols. The lower bound presented in section 5.3 applies to more general probabilistically sound multi-round protocols.
Synchronization
For single-round protocols, synchronization is not an issue. The recipient simply waits for some authenticator, message pair to arrive and then either accepts or FAILS. For multi-round protocols, the intruder is able to carry on two separate, possibly asynchronous, conversations, one with the informant and one with the recipient. However, the party that is supposed to send the message in the i + 1st round always waits until it receives the intruder's ith-round message. Therefore, for each of the two conversations, the protocol forces the intruder to commit to any possible ith-round cheating before soliciting the i + 1st round message. This is used in the proof of validity for our k-round protocol.
Note than in a preliminary version of this paper we were not careful about the forcing the commitment. The multi-round protocol presented there is, as Gehrman 4] pointed out, susceptible to synchronization attacks. This was corrected by making both sides choose the random hash function used for ngerprinting the message. To see that P 1 is a single-round probability p authentication protocol, we show:
Claim 3 H is p-almost strongly universal 2 . Proof: Fix messages m and m 0 , m 6 = m 0 . Let s 2 R H; y = s(m). Let x 2 Q. We will separate the analysis into two cases, x = y and x 6 = y. This better upper bound on the number of secret bits is attained by using a smaller family of p-almost strongly universal 2 hash functions based on a more powerful family of codes which exist, but are not necessarily constructible.
Using probabilistic arguments one can show, as was done by Roth 8] , that there exists a code C with the following properties:
C maps f0; 1g n into GF Q] n 0 Q is equal to In this case, we could de ne s = i where s(m) = C i (m).
Multi-Round Protocols
The multi-round protocols which we present in this section are based on the idea that the two parties reduce in each round the problem of authenticating the original message to that of authenticating a shorter message. The informant sends the input message in the rst round and then the informant and the recipient can carry on the authentication by using a k ? 1-round protocol to authenticate a small, random \ ngerprint" (de ned by a hash function) of the input message that the recipient should have received. If the intruder has changed the input message that the informant sent to the recipient, then with a very high probability the ngerprint for the message received by the recipient will not match the ngerprint for the message that the informant sent in the rst round. If the intruder will not alter any message sent in subsequent rounds, then the informant will be aware of the bad ngerprint sent back by the recipient. In order to assure that the intruder is caught with the appropriate probability the two sides should choose the hash function that de nes the random ngerprint On the y -so as to prevent the intruder from choosing the forged message so that the true message and the forged message will collide on the hash function. Cooperatively -so as to prevent the intruder from using its power to synchronize the participants to learn the hash function before it should be known. This is done using codes similar to those of the single-round protocol. The hash function is simply an index, and the value of the hash function h on x is the hth character in the codeword corresponding to x. The way h is chosen is by letting each of the two sides A and B choose an index i A and i B at random. The value of h is then i A + i B (where the addition is modular). The ngerprint is then h(x) concatenated with i A and i B .
The k-round protocol
The protocol applies a sequence of codes C 1 ; C 2 ; : : :C k Where C j+1 's length is roughly logarithmic in the length of C j and the relative distance of C j is roughly 1 ? p 2 k+2?j . Let C j be a code C j : f0; 1g n j ! GF Q j ]`j where n j ;`j; Q j are de ned below. Let n 1 = n and for j : 1 < j k let n j = dlog Q j + 2 log`je. For j : 1 j k The property C j should maintain is 8m 1 ; m 2 , with m 1 6 = m 2 , C j (m 1 ) and C j (m 2 ) di er in at least 1 ? p 2 k+1?j fraction of their entries.
Given the distance requirement, we should nd codes where`j (the length of the code) and Q j (the alphabet size) are as small as possible. The Reed-Solomon codes are satisfactory; as long as log n j > 2 k+2?j p choose Q j as a prime between n j and 2n j and`j = Q j ? 1 and C j as the corresponding RS code. The minimum relative distance of C j is at least 1= log n j which is su cient. If log n j < 2 k+2?j p < n j , then choose Q j as a prime between n 2 j and 2n 2 j and`j = Q j ? 1 and C j as the corresponding RS code. The minimum relative distance of C j is at at least 1=n j which is su cient. We are now ready to describe the protocol. Note that the addition is mod`j. . The probability of failure is then bounded by P j Pr D j ] plus the probability of failure of P 1 . For any variable y in the above protocol and for a given execution, let T(y) be the time at which the variable y is xed, i.e. T(i A j ) denotes the time in which A sent the message i A j and T(i 0A j ) is the time B received the message corresponding to i A j and T(m A j+1 ) = maxfi A j ; i 0B j g.
We now bound the probability of D j . We will assume in the following argument that j is odd. If j is even, a similar argument goes through. This argument is obtained by switching the roles of A and B in the argument that we present here. We now assume j is odd and consider two cases: This implies that, with probability at least 1 ? p=2, m A k 6 = m B k . Since we run the single-round authentication protocol with security parameter equal to p=2, the overall probability of successful deception is at most p. 2 Claim 6 P k uses dlog (k) (n) + 3e + 5dlog( 1 p ) + 1e secret bits to authenticate messages of length n.
Proof: We will show that the length of m k is small. As long as n j > 2 k+1?j p we have that n j+1 = 2 log`j + log Q j < 6 log n j + 6. Therefore, as long as j < k; n j > 2 k+2?j p ; we have that n j < MAXf7 log Corollary 7 For all n and p there exists a sound log (n) round, secrecy 2 log( 1 p ) + 2, probability p authentication protocol.
Proof: We will use the protocol P log (n) except that we modify the last level of recursion, using the following 1-round authentication protocol instead of P 1 .
Consider the following single-round protocol for a message of the form m = (x; y) where x; y 2 GF Q]. The secret string is (a; b) where a; b 2 GF Q]. To authenticate m = (x; y) send a 2 x+ay+b. It is not hard to verify that this is a protocol for messages of length 2 log Q, the security of this protocol is 2=Q and it uses a shared secret string of length 2 log Q. Set p 0 = p=2 and k = log (n) and run the protocol P k with security p 0 . When the length of the message becomes smaller than 2 log( 1 p 0 ) (as it would eventually), use the above one round protocol. 2 
Lower Bounds
We now consider lower bounds on the number of secret bits which A and B require. Blum et. al . 2] showed that any single-round probability p authentication protocol requires at least log(n) secret bits for any p < 1 2 . We improve this lower bound here.
Lower Bound for Sound Single-round protocols
We now show a lower bound on the number of shared secret bits in single-round protocols. The bound is achieved via a reduction from an authentication scheme to an error-correcting code. Recently, Noga Alon (private communication) improved the lower bound to log(n) + 2 log( 1 p ) ? log log 1 p , a better lower bound, using a bound on distances for codes with maximum weight.
Theorem 8 There is no sound single-round, secrecy log(n) + log( 1 p ) ? log log( n p ) ? 2, probability p authentication protocol for p < 1.
Proof: Let P be a single-round, probability p authentication protocol. The outline of the proof is:
1. We de ne one probability distribution D m;x on the secret strings for each input message, authenticator pair, hm; xi 2. We argue that some large subset of these distributions must be \far apart".
3. We convert this subset of distributions into a set of codewords which forms a code with high minimum distance. 4. We use a lower bound from coding theory to show that the alphabet of the code (which has the same size as the set of possible secret strings) is large. Let L be the number of possible secret strings. We will show that L log(L) at least n p .
Given a xed protocol P for any message m and authenticator x the probability distribution D m;x on the secret strings s given that the input is m and the authenticator is x is well de ned. We show that with probability greater than p, I can successfully substitute a di erent input message when the true input message was m and therefore P would not be a sound security p authentication protocol.
Let the input message be m and the authenticator be x. Let The dimension of C is log 2 l(2 n ) = n l .
Any code must satisfy the inequality dimension < length -distance + 1, where dimension = log(no. of codewords) log(alphabet size) . This implies that n l < p2 l+1 + 1 ) l log( n p ) ? log(l) ? 2 ) l log( n p ) ?
log log( n p ) ? 2. 
Lower Bound for Sound k Round Protocols
The idea behind our lower bound for k round protocols is to show that the existence of a k round, secrecy l, protocol implies the existence of a k round, secrecy l, protocol whose last authenticator has at most 2 l bits and that the existence of this second protocol implies the existence of a k ? 1 round, secrecy l + 2 l protocol.
De nition 3 Given a conversation consisting of input message m and authenticators x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :x k , let the characteristic vector CV (m; x 1 ; : : :x k ) be a binary vector of length 2 l such that the sth bit, CV (m; x 1 ; : : :x k ) s , is 1 i the recipient of the last message accepts given that the shared secret string was s and that the conversation which the recipient of the last message saw was m; x 1 : : :x k .
Note that, for a sound protocol, if the recipient of the last message has any chance of accepting a conversation given a particular secret string, it does so with probability 1 since it must accept all untampered conversations.
Theorem 11 For p < 1, there is no sound k-round, probability p, secrecy blog (k) (n)c ? 1) -authentication scheme.
Proof: We will show that if there is a sound k-round (p; l) -authentication scheme P k then there is a sound k ? 1-round (p; l + 2 l ) -authentication scheme P k?1 . Claim 12 If there is a sound k-round (p; l) -authentication scheme P k then there is a sound kround (p; l) -authentication schemeP k such that the length of the last authenticator, x k , is 2 l .
Proof: Given P k we describe a protocolP k .P k is identical to P k except for the last authenticator.
The new last authenticator is the characteristic vector of the conversation that the sender of the last authenticator would have seen in P k :
x k = CV (w; : : :; x 0 k?3 ; x k?2 ; x 0 k?1 ; x k ) w is the input message understood by the sender of the last authenticator.
The recipient ofx 0 k accepts i :
There exists an authenticator x 0 k such thatx 0 k = CV (w 0 ; : : :; x k?1 ; x 0 k ). In other words, there is an equivalent authenticator which the sender of the last authenticator could have sent in protocol P k . Here w 0 refers to the input that the recipient of the last authenticator understands.
For the shared secret string s, (x 0 k ) s = 1. The recipient of the last authenticator would have accepted in P k if s/he received x 0 k .
To see thatP k is a k-round (p,l)-authentication protocol, we show the following:
1. IfÎ, the adversary for the second protocol, does not interfere with any of the messages, then both A and B will accept and B will know the input. This is clear since the input m is sent in the rst round and since the last message is CV (m; x 1 ; : : :x k ) where x 1 : : :x k are the authenticators A and B actually send. 2. IfÎ is able to cheat A and B in protocolP k then given the same circumstances I could cheat A and B in protocol P k . I's strategy would be to behave exactly as wouldÎ except that on the last round I replaces x k with any x 0 k such thatx 0 k = CV (w 0 ; : : :; x k?2 ; x k?1 ; x 0 k ) .
2
The proof of the theorem is now completed by de ning a new k ? 1 round protocol, P k?1 :
Claim 13 If there exists a k-round (p; l)-authentication protocol P k such that the length of the last authenticator, x k , is jx k j = 2 l , then there exists a k ? 1 round (p; l + 2 l )-authentication protocol, P k?1 .
Proof: Description of P k?1
We do away with the kth round completely by adding the advice x k to the shared secret string s where x k is the last authenticator that would have been sent in the conversation as it would have occurred in P k with no interference from the adversary. The advice for the protocol P k?1 consists of the original l bits of advice from protocol P k appended to this 2 l bit x k . We note that, in this situation, the secret string depends on the input message and possibly the random bits of A and B. However this is acceptable since the lower bound of log(n) presented in 2] applies to such protocols.
At the end of the k ? 1st round, the party who would have sent the kth authenticator, x k , in protocol P k instead checks to see that x k = x k .
The party who would have received the kth message checks to see that they would have accepted x k in P k In other words, the party who would have received the kth message in P k looks at x k and acts as if s/he received that.
To show that P k?1 is a k ? 1-round (p; l + 2 l )-authentication protocol, we note:
1. If there is been no interference by an intruder, then the party that would have sent the last authenticator in P k will note that x k = x k . Furthermore, since P k is sound, the other party would accept x k . 2. If A and B accept an altered input message in protocol P k?1 , then the adversary in the protocol P k could convince A and B to accept by acting as s/he would in P k?1 and then delivering, unaltered, the last authenticator x k . The recipient of the last authenticator would accept since we have x k = x k .
2 This concludes the proof of the theorem. 2 
Lower Bounds for Probabilistically Sound Protocols
We now consider lower bounds for protocols which are not necessarily sound: even with no interference from the adversary, they are allowed some probability of failure. (n))), probability p authentication protocol for any c independent of n.
Proof: The proof is similar to that lower bounding the number of secret bits needed in a k-round sound protocol. As in the previous theorem CV (m; x 1 ; : : :; x k ) = 1 i the recipient of the last message would accept with probability 1=2 given the conversation has been m; x 1 : : :x k . This approximation leads to a possible doubling of the error for each conversion of the k round protocol P k to a k round protocolP k which has a short last message. If the intruder I has interfered in conversation m; x 1 ; : : :; x k and the probability that A and B accept in P k?1 is at least q = 1 2 then CV (m; x 1 ; : : :; x k ) = 1 and the probability that A and B accept inP k is 1 2q. 2 
Redundancy Lower Bounds for Sound Protocols
In the previous sections, we showed that multi-round protocols can be used to lessen the number of secret bits that two parties need to share in order to authenticate an n bit message. However, in the protocols we presented, the number of bits exchanged, including the input message and the authenticators, was more than n. Here, we show a lower bound on the redundancy, the extra information which they have to share or transmit in order to authenticate an n bit input message.
De nition 5 The redundancy of an authentication protocol is equal to the sum of the number of authentication bits { the x i 's transmitted between A and B { plus the number of shared secret bits.
Theorem 16 For any sound k-round authentication protocol P, the redundancy of P is at least log(n). This is signi cant since it shows that while more rounds may decrease the number of secret bits needed, more rounds cannot decrease the redundancy below log(n).
Proof: Assume that the protocol P uses: t bits for the authenticators and l bits for the shared secret string. For each input message m and secret string s, de ne: D(m; s) is the probability distribution on the authenticators that would appear in a conversation between A and B using message m and secret string s. . Because the two vectors have the same set of possible authenticator sequences in each entry, for any s, any authenticator sequence x which could be generated during a conversation using m and s could also be generated by A and B during a conversation using m 0 and s. From soundness, we know that such authenticators must also be accepted. Therefore, if t + l < log(n), an intruder could always substitute m 0 for m with no chance of being detected. 2 
Authentication Series
Unlike the rest of the paper here we deal with the case where the two parties wish to communicate several unrelated messages. We discuss methods for authenticating a series of l distinct n bit messages where the informant wishes to send each input message before the next is known. This topic has been previously discussed by Wegman and Carter 15] and Stinson 12] . Wegman and
Carter presents a means of converting any single-round secrecy s protocol into an authentication series, good for l messages, using s+l log(1=p) secret bits. Stinson exhibits an authentication series, good for l messages, using (l + 1) maxfn; log 1 p g shared secret bits.
We improve these results by slightly lowering the number of secret bits required in the single-round case and generalizing the idea of an authentication series to multi-round protocols.
We also improve Wegman and Carter's lower bound of l log( 1 p ) secret bits for single-round, l-message authentication series and generalize Stinson's bound of (l + 1) log( 1 p ). The latter bound applies to the case where the probability of deception is exactly equal to 1 divided by the size of the set of authenticators. We show that any single-round series without splitting requires (l+1) log( : :m l , if there is no interference in any of the transmissions in any protocol, then the probability of failure in any protocol must be at most p. If there is no interference with any protocol and A and B accept in all protocols with probability 1, we say that the scheme is sound.
For all possible combinations of input messages, in the rst protocol where B does not learn the correct message, A or B must output FAIL with probability at least 1 ? p in that protocol. (k) (n)e + 5dlog( 1 p )e) -protocol described in theorem 4 above using i = i 0 ; a = a 0 ; b = b j . In rounds j where I does not cheat, I gains only information of the form: a 0 C i 0 (m) + b j . Since each b j is random and used only once, I gains no information about either a 0 or i 0 and so when I tries to cheat, its probability of success is the same as in the single protocol version. 2 
The Issue of Quanti ers
Here we address what quanti ers we will use to de ne authentication protocols. In both our upper and lower bound arguments, we consider protocols that have the property that for all messages m and for all messages m 0 such that m 0 6 = m, the intruder I has less than probability p of successfully substituting m 0 for m.
This de nition of authentication may seem relatively demanding on the communicating parties. There are two obvious ways in which it could be relaxed. We mention situations in which these relaxations would be inappropriate and also what e ect they may have on the lower bounds.
We could require that given a uniform probability distribution on the inputs message m, the adversary can not cheat with probability more than p, where the cheating probability is taken over the input message as well as the secret string and the private coins of A, B, and I.
One problem with this assumption is that the actual distribution on possible inputs is not necessarily uniform. The inputs which are most likely to occur may be ones on which the adversary can successfully cheat. Also, the existing lower bounds on the number of secret bits apply to protocols which make this relaxation. If there is a substantial fraction of inputs on which the adversary can not cheat, then the number of secret bits required is the same as if the relaxation was not made.
We believe that even protocols which may use secrecy to obscure the value of m from the adversary will also require a similar number secret bits.
If the intruder is to try to cheat on input message m, we require only that for most messages m 0 , the adversary can not substitute m 0 for m with probability more than p. The trouble with this approach is that, as the size of the message space increases, the number of messages m 0 which a real-world adversary might want to substitute for m may also increase. One can show that if this number grows at least as fast as 2 n C for some constant C, then the lower bounds are una ected.
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